

IN THE COUNTY COURT AT BRISTOL



2 Redcliff Street
Bristol
BS1 6GR

Date of hearing: 16 April 2026

Before:

DISTRICT JUDGE NAPIER

Between:

BRISTOL CITY COUNCIL

Claimant

- and -

PERSONS UNKNOWN

Defendants

Mr Denford appeared on behalf of the Claimant
There was no appearance by the Defendants

JUDGMENT

Handed down in open court at 2pm on Tuesday 5 May 2026

DISTRICT JUDGE NAPIER:

1. This is my reserved judgment following the hearing on 16 April 2026. At that hearing, I granted the possession order sought by the Claimant and indicated my

reasons would follow. These are those reasons, along with my decision on the application to extend the terms and area of the current injunction.

2. I start with some general observations given the heightened public interest in these proceedings.
3. The question of the use of the Downs is a multi-faceted one and one which gives rise to emotions on all sides of the debate. There are those who believe, fervently, that vehicle dwelling should not be permitted and that the Claimant has ignored the growing numbers of van dwellers over the years.
4. On the other side, there are the people who find themselves living on the Downs. They are ordinary people trying to live in their homes in often difficult circumstances. I am very aware they do not fit into any one single demographic. They come from all walks of life and include those who live in vehicles out of necessity, but also out of choice. I am conscious some of them have very difficult personal, medical, and social circumstances.
5. The function of the Court is not to decide social policy questions about housing, the cost of living, or the 'politics' of the use of the Downs. Those are political matters for the Claimant as the local authority and its elected councillors. Those councillors, and the Downs Committee, are responsible for the policy decisions governing the Downs and van dwelling in the City.
6. The role of the judiciary is to decide claims brought to us impartially, independently and without fear or favour to anyone. The Claimant has decided to bring a legal claim for a possession order and for a further injunction. That is a decision for it to take. Having done so, it is my role to consider the evidence

properly put before the Court, apply the law, and reach a decision on whether the Claimant is entitled to the orders it seeks.

BACKGROUND

7. The background to the claim, along with my analysis of the law, factual findings, and conclusions as to why the current injunction should be granted, are set out in my judgment of 25 July 2025 published at the National Archives, BAILII and on the Claimant's website. The relevant citation is Bristol City Council v Persons Unknown [\[2025\] EWCC 53](#).
8. I will not repeat what is in my earlier judgment and this judgment must be read alongside it.
9. I will refer to the injunction order which came out of the hearing in July, and which is still in force, as "the Main Order".

JULY 2025 TO DATE

10. Following the Main Order, and consistent with case law for newcomer injunctions, a review hearing for the Main Order was conducted on 18 November 2025. At that hearing, a member of the public¹ ("X") indicated he wished to challenge the Main Order. The hearing was adjourned to 5 December 2025 to allow X to file their evidence and consider whether or not they wished to be joined as a defendant to the proceedings.

¹ At the hearing on 5 December 2025, I decided that it was inappropriate to name X due to the sensitive and private medical information which they had filed with the court and that this outweighed the strong public interest of knowing the identity of those seeking to be involved in the proceedings

11. On 5 December 2025, for the reasons stated on the order from that occasion, X's request was refused. However, the Claimant indicated that it would be applying to extend the Main Order. A further hearing was listed for 5 February 2026 for the giving of directions once the applications had been issued.
12. The Claimant issued their application to extend the Main Order on 4 February 2026 ("the Extension Application"). They issued a claim for a possession order of various areas of land and roads on 18 February 2026 which was issued under claim number N00BS177 ("the Possession Claim").
13. On 5 February 2026, I held the directions hearing and made a number of orders concerning case management. It is important to record at that hearing I permitted a number of different groups to address the Court even though they were not parties to the claim. I permitted this because it was in keeping with the review nature of the hearing, the number of people who would potentially be affected by the Extension Application and the Possession Claim, and the overriding objective.
14. In particular, I heard from the Claimant, the group called "Protect the Downs" and the group called "Bristol Housing Action Movement" (who support those living on the Downs). They were all permitted to address the Court on the best and most inclusive way forward for the proceedings. Those speaking on behalf of those living on the Downs were particularly concerned that more needed to be done to inform people of the proceedings and make them aware of the Claimant's case. I agreed with that position and (as will follow) required the Claimant to take steps over and above those which would normally be expected of claimants in the service and preparation of the proceedings.

15. Equally, I made clear to everyone present (of which there were a good number of people) that the Civil Procedure Rules (“CPR”) applied and there must be fairness to the Claimant as well as to any potential defendants. Whilst I was prepared to have an open and inclusive ‘discussion’ at that hearing to allow those affected to engage with the proceedings, it was explained in no uncertain terms that the trial of the Extension Application and Possession Claim must be conducted on a formal basis, in compliance with the CPR, with sworn evidence provided, and the parties knowing what the case of each other was.
16. In consequence of this, I directed:
- i) Service of the proceedings would take place by way of notices placed on and around the Downs in locations approved by the Court.
 - ii) The content of the notices must be approved by the Court.
 - iii) The Claimant must maintain a page on its website, linked to by a QR code on the notice, on which all statements of case, the evidence, the orders, and the previous judgment were published.
 - iv) The statement of case and evidence of the Claimant must be served on St Mungo’s (the charity) and Bristol Housing Action Movement.
 - v) Any potential defendant had until 20 March 2026 to apply to join the claim and file their evidence.
17. Concerns were expressed by those present at the costs risk of joining the proceedings if they were unsuccessful. I indicated that I would not make a costs capping order under CPR 3 as there was no application to do so and, as set out

in PD 3E, these are only made in exceptional circumstances. I did invite, and it accepted, the Claimant to consider its costs position in the event it was successful. As a result of this, the Claimant agreed that it would only seek its costs if a defence was found to be without merit (as opposed to just being unsuccessful). A statement to this effect was included in the public notice of the proceedings.

18. In the end result, no one applied to defend the proceedings. A group called “Bristol Van Dweller Alliance” filed submissions but no application and no sworn witness statement. The Claimant considered and addressed their document nevertheless in the hearing.
19. I set all this out because at, and following, the hearing on 16 April there have been suggestions that the Court did not permit certain groups to speak and address the Court – the implication being this was unfair or unexpected. I reject that position. The process has been fair and the Court went over and above the requirements of the CPR to allow those who wished to take part to do so. The Court can only tilt the scales so far before the process becomes unfair to the other side.
20. The procedural conclusion is that no defendant has appeared to contest the claim. That is not the end of the matter because, where the relief is discretionary, the Court must still be satisfied that it is appropriate to grant such relief. It is for the Claimant to prove this on its evidence.

THE POSSESSION CLAIM

21. The Claimant is entitled to use the trespasser possession procedure. Under CPR 55.1(b), ‘a possession claim against trespassers’ means a claim for the recovery of land which a claimant alleges is occupied only by a person or persons who entered or remained on the land without the consent of a person entitled to possession of that land. It does not include situations where there has been a tenancy which has been terminated, but that does not apply here as no one has informed the Court of any tenancy they hold or held.
22. Outside the highways in question, the Claimant is the owner of the land in question. It owns the land on Durdham Down and, in relation to Clifton Down, my earlier judgment sets out the provisions of the Act and the Claimant’s entitlement to the land under the provisions of that Act and its agreement with the Society of Merchant Venturers. There is no defence putting forward a better entitlement. The Claimant’s evidence shows that its land is being trespassed on and therefore it is entitled to a possession order.
23. Turning to the roads, which are highways in law, the Claimant is the highway authority for the roads in question here: s 1(2) Highways Act 1980. Under s 263 of the same Act, the roads vest in the Claimant and it has a duty under s 130 to act on behalf of the public, viz:

“(1) It is the duty of the highway authority to assert and protect the rights of the public to the use and enjoyment of any highway for which they are the highway authority, including any roadside waste which forms part of it.

(2) Any council may assert and protect the rights of the public to the use and enjoyment of any highway in their area for which they are not the highway authority, including any roadside waste which forms part of it.

(3) Without prejudice to subsections (1) and (2) above, it is the duty of a council who are a highway authority to prevent, as far as possible, the stopping up or obstruction of ... the highways for which they are the highway authority [...]

(4) Without prejudice to the foregoing provisions of this section, it is the duty of a local highway authority to prevent any unlawful encroachment on any roadside waste comprised in a highway for which they are the highway authority.

24. This gives the Claimant ample statutory standing to bring the claim for possession.
25. The relevant tests were set out by Fancourt J in The Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Hackney & Anor v Powlesland & Ors [2020] EWHC 2102 (Ch) at [24]. The second and third of the tests are not relevant here – there is no one other than the Claimant seeking possession and there is no suggestion the persons unknown are temporarily on the highway to such a degree they cannot be said to be in possession of it.
26. On the first test, having considered the decision of the Court of Appeal in Wiltshire County Council v Frazer (1984) 47 P & CR 69, His Lordship concluded that:

“If the occupation is not merely temporary but ousts the highway authority to any degree, even though the highway is still passable, the highway authority (in this case the Council) is entitled to claim possession from those who will not otherwise move.”

27. That is clearly the case here from the uncontested witness evidence. The persons unknown residing on the roads in question are dispossessing the Claimant of the highway and this is in no way a temporary situation. Their presence on the highway prevents other lawful users from using the same section to pass and repass over it as the law permits them to do.
28. I have considered, notwithstanding the lack of any defence, whether the possession order is a disproportionate interference with the Article 8 rights of the persons unknown who have lived on the land long enough to establish a private or family life there. These rights have to be balanced against the rights of others, in this case the Claimant’s property and public rights. In my judgment, the interference is proportionate. The trespass is sustained and long standing and repeated by multiple persons. Those wishing to reside in caravans or vans are able to do so elsewhere.
29. For these reasons, I grant the possession order. By law, possession orders in trespass cases must be granted with immediate effect but, as the Claimant has elected to seek a deferred date, I ordered that possession of the land and highways must be yielded up to the Claimant by 4pm on 7 May 2026.

GENERAL INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

30. At paragraphs 12 to 17 of my previous judgment, I set out the law in relation to applications for injunctions under common law or in equity (a general injunction) which I adopt again.
31. An important element of the applicable tests is the Claimant is entitled to an injunction to restrain a threatened or apprehended trespass on its land, but it must prove it is more likely than not there is an imminent danger of very substantial damage, or further damage.
32. I am not persuaded from the Claimant's evidence that this is the case here. Unlike the earlier stage of the proceedings, there have never been any orders against those living on the roads around the Downs. Their numbers fluctuate substantially – at the start of this process it was over 100 and now it is around 45 as of the date of the hearing.
33. There is an important distinction between the groups who have repeatedly entered onto grassed areas of land on the Downs and caused substantial damage (as set out in my previous judgment involving multiple sets of possession proceedings) and those who have been living on the roads and have never been asked to leave. This has always been the deliberate litigation choice of the Claimant.
34. Put simply, the evidence shows that we simply do not yet know that the Claimant's entitlement to possession is going to be infringed because this is the first time the Claimant has sought possession. I do not know, nor does the

Claimant beyond any speculation, what will happen once the possession order is served and begins to take effect.

35. In these circumstances, my judgment is that the Claimant is not entitled a general injunction. The balance of convenience does not fall in favour of the Claimant at this point. As was stated in Wolverhampton, there must be in a newcomer injunction a compelling justification for the injunction against persons unknown to protect the Claimant's civil rights. That is not the case here.
36. I accept the situation may be very different if, after 7 May 2026 and any subsequent enforcement of the possession order, there are repeated trespasses to the land and highways. If that occurs, the Claimant will be able to apply for a general injunction and it is likely I will not consider it proportionate to go through the same wide-ranging procedural stages as it took to reach this trial.
37. For these reasons, the application for a general injunction is dismissed.

ANTI SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR INJUNCTION

38. I set out the law in relation to anti-social behaviour injunctions at paragraph 18 of my previous judgment.
39. My assessment of the evidence leading to the grant of an anti social behaviour injunction over limited sections of Clifton Down and Durdham Down is explained in my judgment of 25 July 2025. I will not repeat it again.
40. I turn to the evidence since that time. The evidence of Ms Ennion and Mr James was not disputed at the hearing.

41. In Ms Ennion's Third Witness Statement, she explained the incursions onto the grassed areas of the Downs prohibited under the Main Order. She sets out how different groups who have occupied the land have moved off when served with the Main Order (which permits arrest after two hours of service if not complied with). On one occasion, an amount of household rubbish had to be cleared. On another, Ms Ennion explained that a group which previously left a very significant amount of rubbish on the Downs moved off in short order. In her view, the Main Order has increased public confidence in the management of the Downs because it has reduced the incursions onto the grassed land.
42. In Mr James's witness statements, he accepts that the groups that lived on the grassed land, and those who lived on the roads, were distinct and separate groups "*of substantially different backgrounds*".
43. Mr James has provided a map identifying areas where human excrement has had to be regularly cleared by the Claimant's staff, and public bins into which bagged human excrement has been placed. The map shows three large marked areas where human waste is often found. One runs alongside Circular Road, another along Parry's Lane as it is bounded by Saville Road and the A4018, and the other between Clay Pit Road and Westbury Park. All three of those roads are where the highest concentration of van dwellers are.
44. Mr James has provided photographic evidence of human and other waste being found in wooded areas on the Downs by Enforcement Officers. The photos clearly show accumulations of waste and makeshift toileting areas. The Enforcement Officer describes what they found as "*All areas marked were found to contain evidence of human waste, including excrement (historic and*

fresh), toilet tissue, and multiple empty plastic water bottles believed to be used for sanitary purposes". The footfall and worn paths in the area led the enforcement officers to the vans on Parry's Lane.

45. As a result of these discoveries, the Claimant uses Bristol Waste to clear the sites. They visit the sites twice a month. When waste is found (which Mr James accepted was not on every occasion), the clearance cost is around £1,300. This is paid for by the Claimant. Mr James considers the only viable option would be to provide ten portaloos with associated cleaning and waste disposal to mitigate against this issue. He explains in his evidence why it is inappropriate for the Claimant to take that step (as opposed to temporary events on the Downs which use them, or at the meanwhile sites).
46. Mr James explained that from April 2025 to the date of his statement, 254 complaints had been received. 159 were received before that. He does not explain who they come from and I bear in mind that it is likely some are duplications or repeats of the same complaint or from the same person.
47. Mr James sets out the range of harm the Claimant considers is occurring: litter and environmental damage (including fly-tipping and general waste), human waste and sanitation concerns, accumulations of rubbish, anti social behaviour (described as fights, drug activity and inappropriate behaviour) which includes children being found playing in the human excrement, inappropriate parking, water pollution, pests and odour, environmental harm, and the costs incurred with addressing waste.
48. Mr James explains in his witness statement the engagement actions the Claimant has taken with the van dwelling community. Welfare checks and assessments

have been carried out, as well as assessments of the Claimant's duties under the public sector equality duty. The assessment forms from visits conducted on 2 and 11 December 2025 are in evidence before me. Most occupants were not present when the officers visited and a substantial number of vehicles were locked up or appeared abandoned. Three individuals refused to speak to the officers or threw the papers back at them.

49. Finally, Mr James has explained the enforcement plan in the event the Claimant is granted the orders it seeks.

50. My decision on the claim for an anti-social behaviour injunction is as follows:

i) As Mr James set out in his own evidence, it is important to draw a distinction between those who occupy the grassed areas of the Downs, and those who occupy the roads surrounding it (the van dwellers). They are distinct and separate groups and it would be wrong to view the claim through the same prism in relation to them both.

ii) Anti-social behaviour is defined by s 2(1) of the 2014 Act as:

a) conduct that has caused, or is likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress to any person; or

b) conduct capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to a person in relation to that person's occupation of residential premises.

iii) Concerning the first group (those who occupy the grassed areas), I see no reason from the evidence before me at the hearing to part from my earlier judgment. The further witness evidence of Ms Ennion shows that

the injunction is still necessary and multiple groups have attempted to reside on the grassed areas in breach of the Main Order and the Byelaws governing the Downs. My findings of anti social behaviour are less than a year old and I find still apply to the groups who have committed incursions onto the grassed areas. It is still just and convenient to have an injunction and I will extend it to cover all the grassed areas of land within the application.

- iv) Concerning the second group (those living on the roads), the evidence is very clear that there are substantial accumulations of rubbish and human waste in and around the Downs. The correlation between where these have been found, and the greater concentrations of vans, means I draw the reasonable inference that those living in the vans are the primary cause of this – in particular the human waste.
- v) I have accepted in my analysis that there will be a level of detritus left by the general public and this is not caused by the van dwellers. However, I consider the accumulations are substantially contributed to by the van dwellers and there is no other logical explanation for the correlation between where waste is found and the greater concentration of vans.
- vi) The question is whether this constituted anti-social behaviour under the 2014 Act. As set out earlier, the term has a specific legal meaning.
- vii) I start with limb (b) as that test is lower in relation to housing-related conduct (see paragraph [105] of Swindon Borough Council v Abrook [2024] EWCA Civ 230). The Claimant relied on limb (b) due to the

effect of the van dwelling on the local residents who live on the roads where van dwellers are living.

- viii) I do not agree that the test applies. Whilst the bar is lower, there must still be causal link between the conduct complained of and any nuisance or annoyance of the local resident in relation to the occupation of their property. However, the conduct is not just the mere presence of a van on the road, or someone living within it. As I have found, it is the implication of the wider effect and impact on the Downs that their presence has. I have not heard any persuasive evidence that the presence of the vans leads to nuisance or annoyance in relation to the occupation of residential premises. I accept that some local residents do not like, and do not want, van dwellers living nearby, or consider the Downs are not the appropriate place to park and live. That is not the same as suffering a nuisance or annoyance in relation to occupation of a residential property. Therefore, I consider that limb (b) is not made out.
- ix) Turning to limb (a), whereby the conduct must have caused, or is likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress to any person. ‘Harassment’ in the civil context was defined by the Supreme Court in Hayes v Willoughby [2013] UKSC 17 as: *“persistent and deliberate course of unreasonable and oppressive conduct, targeted at another person, which is calculated to and does cause that person alarm, fear or distress”*. That is not the case here. There is no evidence that the conduct of those living in the vans is targeted at another person or calculated to cause alarm, fear or distress.

- x) That leaves me with whether the conduct causes alarm or distress to any person. It is important to stand back and consider the wider context. The Downs are held on statutory trust by the Claimant and the Society to remain as open and unenclosed land as a place for public resort and recreation for the citizens of Bristol. That is the purpose for which the Downs must be made freely available to the public.
- xi) I consider that the above evidence, which is uncontested, shows it is more likely than not that there is alarm or distress to the public. The free presence of human waste and the accumulations of other rubbish is a public health hazard and poses risks to the public as they go about their lawful enjoyment of the Downs. I have considered carefully the photographic evidence and I consider it goes very far beyond what is acceptable in a public recreational space. The high level of complaints which the Claimant receives shows that a sufficiently wide section of the public is affected by this.
- xii) For these reasons, I consider the Claimant has shown there is anti social behaviour and is, in principle, entitled to an injunction.
51. The second stage is whether it is just and convenient to grant an injunction. In summary, what is the proportionate response to the anti social behaviour?
52. No one has appeared to defend the claim, but that is not the end of the matter. As the Claimant seeks a ‘newcomer’ injunction, the Court must consider the potential defences available to the persons unknown.

53. I accept that, for van-dwellers who have lived on the Downs for a significant period of time, a proposed injunction would potentially interfere with their Article 8 rights to a private life and interference with their homes.
54. However, any rights under Article 8 are not absolute. Article 8(2) states that the right can be interfered with in a proportionate manner as is in accordance with the law and as necessary in a democratic society in the interests of, among other things, public safety, the protection of health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Essentially, any order must be proportionate when balancing the legitimate needs of society with that of the individual.
55. The right to property is also a Convention right, protected by Article 1 of the First Protocol ('A1P1'). The Claimant has the benefit of this. In a democratic society, the protection of property rights is a legitimate aim, which may justify interference with the rights guaranteed by other qualified Articles. Trespass is an interference with A1P1 rights, which in turn requires justification and Article 8 and other qualified rights cannot normally justify a person in trespassing on land of which another has the right to possession, just because the defendant wishes to do so for the purposes of making it their home when they have no legal right to be there. Interference by trespass will rarely be a necessary and proportionate way of exercising an Article 8 right.
56. I do not consider a defence under Article 8 has no realistic prospect of success. Any injunction would be granted pursuant to law. The repeated trespass to Claimant's property, the damage caused and harm posed, and interference to the public's legal right of enjoyment of whole of the Downs are not justified under

any Article 8 rights. The proposed injunction has a wholly legitimate aim i.e. to protect the Claimant's (and the public's) civil rights to the Downs and access and enjoyment of them, to avoid damage and littering, to avoid health and safety dangers, and to protect those who use the Downs as members of the public, the Claimant's staff, and those who have legitimately acquired a right to hold commercial or charitable events on the Downs.

57. I do not consider there are less restrictive means available to achieve the aim of protecting the Claimants' civil rights and property than the terms of the final injunction. An injunction in the terms to be granted strikes a fair balance. As I explained in my earlier judgment, other potential remedies do not suffice.
58. I bear in mind that the persons unknown are only being prohibited from being in a defined and limited geographic area. This is in no way a 'county-wide' injunction. It concerns an area of land which is frequently trespassed upon.
59. For these reasons, I do not consider that there is any realistic prospect of success of a potential defence. The Court has considered the defences commonly available which the Claimant has, in compliance with its duty of full and frank disclosure, put before the Court. Any other defences, if available, have not been put before the Court by any potential defendant. If there are any, the right to apply to set aside or vary is a sufficient procedural safeguard.
60. The next question is whether, under the question of convenience, there is a compelling justification to make a newcomer injunction as opposed to an injunction against those already present.

61. Weighing up all the evidence, I am persuaded there is. There has now been, over a very significant period time, substantial littering and pollution from those living in vans which I have found constituted a public health hazard. It is also a breach of the Byelaws made under the Act which constitutes a criminal offence. I fail to see why it is appropriate that the Claimant must incur the repeated cost of the cleaning of the human waste and other rubbish off the Downs on a regular basis.
62. Finally, damages are not an adequate remedy – as before, there is no prospect that anyone is going to be identified to pay damages to the Claimant. No one has attended Court to offer any undertakings in lieu of an injunction.
63. Concerning the procedural requirements for a newcomer injunction concerning identification of the class, the terms, the geographic boundaries, duration, and service, I am satisfied these are all met.
64. I consider it is appropriate for the injunction to run for one year from today.
65. The injunction will contain a right to apply to set aside or vary the injunction on two clear days' notice.

I consider it is appropriate to review the injunction in September. At that hearing, the Court will decide whether to set another review date or allow it to run its course.

POWER OF ARREST

66. The Claimant requests that a power of arrest is added on the ground of a significant risk of harm to others. This test must be applied in a suitably robust

manner. Anti-social behaviour causes differing degrees of distress or anxiety and the barrier for a power of arrest must not too low. Powers of arrest should be used in cases where there is a significant risk of harm beyond mere distress.

67. 'Harm' is primarily used in ASBI proceedings to mean physical or psychological harm. However, there is no statutory limit to just these two categories. It is accepted it can mean harm in a wider context, such as nuisance and environmental harm.
68. It is not a risk of significant harm, but rather the significant risk of harm that matters. As I set out in my earlier judgment, there is a significant risk of harm in relation to those who occupy the grassed areas of the Downs. I considered a power of arrest was warranted before, albeit it has not been exercised to date, and nothing I have read or heard in this new application persuades me otherwise now. Therefore, the extended injunction as it applies to the grassed areas of land will contain a power of arrest.
69. However, I take a different view in relation to the roads and those living on them in vans. Whilst I have found there is anti-social behaviour and harm for the reasons set out earlier, I do not consider it is proportionate or just to add a power of arrest to the aspects of the injunction which require people only to not be present on, or leave when requested, the roads. The risk of harm posed is much lower, and whilst it is above the threshold to grant an injunction, it is not at a level where a power of arrest is warranted.
70. Therefore, I will not attach a power of arrest to the terms of the injunction which affect the roads and highways insofar as it concerns only trespassing or being present on the roads when required to leave.

71. However, breaching the other terms of the injunction in any area, such as defecating/urinating, placing waste, or causing nuisance, harassment, alarm or distress, is covered by the power of arrest across all areas of the land. Otherwise, there would be a wholly artificial distinction between the area of land a breach occurred on.
72. However, I wish to be clear on two matters:
- i) This decision does not affect the powers of a bailiff or High Court Enforcement Officer to use lawful force from enforcing a warrant or writ of possession. The order of possession is a court order and must be complied with.
 - ii) The Claimant remains entitled under section 10 of the 2014 Act to apply to the County Court for a warrant to arrest any individual who is in breach of the anti-social behaviour injunction. Applications for a warrant can be made without notice and the expectation must be that if the Court is presented with evidence showing an individual is aware of the injunction and has broken it, they will be arrested and brought before the Court to be dealt with for contempt.

SUMMARY

73. In summary:
- i) The claim for a possession order is granted.
 - ii) The claim for a general injunction is dismissed.

- iii) The application to extend the current Main Order as an anti-social behaviour injunction is granted.
- iv) The application to add a power of arrest to the extended injunction is granted but not for breaches of the injunction which concern only being present on the roads, or not leaving when required.

74. That is my judgment.